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Introduction 
 
Cold War deterrence strategy was based on a balance of terror or mutual 
assured destruction, but the 21st Century contains new threats, new actors, 
not so easily deterred. While nuclear deterrence remains important, 
regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
accompanying long-range delivery capabilities are a rising concern as 
noted by United States-North Korean relations and rhetoric of the past few 
years. New technological breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and 
unforeseen realms could also provide asymmetric means of undermining 
deterrence. Traditional deterrence is less certain in this environment, and 
policies (along with accompanying capabilities) of the Cold War era may 
actually be destabilizing, as additional regional powers are increasingly 
likely to arm themselves with WMD or asymmetric technologies. 
Kartchner and Gerson state that there is a greater possibility for limited 
nuclear war in this post-Cold War era.1 
 
Furthermore, the effort to achieve strategic stability has become 
increasingly complicated in light of the changing relationship between the 
great powers. The era of bipolarity ended with the Cold War and today the 
United States is no longer the hegemon it became by default with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s world has become one of security 
trilemmas, according to Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper: actions 
one state takes to defend against another can, in-turn, make a third state 
feel insecure.2 For example, Russian efforts to deter the United States also 
impact European security. Chinese actions influence the United States, 
Russia, and India. Therefore, the security trilemma means that actions 
that would have mattered only on a bilateral level, in Cold War terms, now 
have greater strategic consequences. 
 
So how did we get to where we are today? Why do U.S. policymakers see 
the Cold War triad as the best solution to continued strategic stability? 
Have they considered the changed environment of the post-Cold War 
world? Our discussion will begin with deterrence thinking of the early Cold 
War, proposing the need to differentiate counter-value and counterforce 
targeting for a 21st Century deterrence construct, and defining strategic 
stability for our time with accompanying refinement of the trilemma 
argument introduced above. This narrative will point out flaws in the 
proposed triad; there is great need for both nuclear diversity (theater and 
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low-yield weapons) and non-nuclear elements in the deterrent force to 
provide strategic stability in the decades ahead. In sum, we need a 
deterrence construct that both deters nuclear use by the great powers and 
terminates nuclear use by so-called rogue states initiating nuclear wars on 
neighbors. This essay presents a stratified deterrence policy, which 
addresses deterrence needs at each potential level of conflict. 
 
Early Deterrence Thinking 
 
Just after World War II ended, General “Hap” Arnold who led Army Air 
Forces during the war, offered enduring advice about deterrence: “Our 
first line of defense is the ability to retaliate even after receiving the 
hardest blow the enemy can deliver.”3 Therefore, from its early beginnings, 
nuclear deterrence had to mean to an enemy that retaliation would come 
following nuclear weapons use. Bernard Brodie took this logic one-step 
further:  
 
The first and most vital step in the American security program for 
the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee ourselves 
in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind…Thus far the 
chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. 
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have 
almost no other useful purpose.4 
 
Development of an assured retaliation is the best means of deterring an 
enemy over time. This concept came to be known as a survivable second 
strike capability, or the ability to survive an enemy nuclear force that 
strikes first. It doesn’t matter whether the enemy focuses its efforts on 
military bases and forces or the U.S. population centers. Retaliation which 
disables the enemy in a way that ensures defeat, whether it be near 
complete loss of military forces or unacceptable damage to his polity and 
society, would assure the United States a second strike capability. The idea 
was to achieve Mutual Assured Destruction between the superpowers. 
 
As the 1950s unfolded, the U.S. nuclear posture consisted of a growing 
bomber force with sufficient numbers for retaliation against any Soviet 
attack. Toward the end of the decade as rumors of a bomber gap, and later, 
a missile gap unfolded, the United States was developing intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
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(SLBMs). Fear of the rumors, aided in the case of the missile gap by the 
success of Sputnik, and not discounting U.S. inter-service rivalry, resulted 
in eventual deployment of a triad of bombers, missiles, and submarines 
that would guarantee survival and ensure a second strike capability against 
Soviet nuclear aggression. 
 
Still, there were two additional Cold War perspectives on deterrence. 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), was only one such perception based 
upon stability. Lebow and Stein argue that many among the U.S. military 
establishment argued for a stronger option: strategic superiority, a 
decapitation strategy to destroy Soviet leadership, command, control and 
communications abilities associated with warfighting, and hardened 
targets enabling a nuclear warfighting victory over the Soviets. In essence, 
the goal was to go beyond MAD and have the means to eliminate a Soviet 
second strike should nuclear war break out. And at the opposite end of the 
spectrum there was a third option: finite deterrence, arguing that nuclear 
deterrence only required limited capabilities along the lines of other major 
powers nuclear inventories besides the United States and the Soviet 
Union.5 A minimal ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons was enough 
due to the uncertainly that some might get through defenses and strike 
their targets, so that even a few nuclear detonations received in retaliation 
would create too high of a cost for a nation contemplating a first strike. 
 
Lebow and Stein go on to compare the strategies to the Cuban missile 
crisis of 1963. Despite a numerical advantage of 3500 usable nuclear 
weapons in the U.S. strategic inventory compared to the Soviet’s 350, and 
further belief that only 30 or so of their weapons would likely reach targets 
in the United States, America was deterred. As McGeorge Bundy 
described, “even if one Soviet weapon landed on an American target, we 
would all be losers."6 The United States was deterred in spite of its own 
nuclear superiority, pointing to finite deterrence as the more rational 
option. Minimum deterrence, while unintentional on the part of the 
Soviets, worked. The authors go on to argue that other Cold War crises 
also occurred when the Soviet Union was weak and the United States was 
strong, but then the relationship stabilized when the Soviets achieved 
nuclear parity. In other words, the imbalance prompted Soviet posturing 
in each crisis. The authors add that “too much deterrence,” as in MAD, 
fuels an arms race that makes both sides less secure, and thus, conclude 
that finite deterrence is the most stabilizing posture “because it prompts 
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mutual caution” between the superpowers.7 Still, finite deterrence does not 
fully address strategic stability per the assured destruction concept 
embedded within MAD. To enhance this concept further, I turn to another 
Cold War deterrence concept. 
 
Counter-value vs Counterforce 
 
In 1960, a major debate was ensuing between the Air Force and Navy over 
counterforce and counter value (or counter-cities) targeting strategy. The 
Navy maintained that its proposed Polaris submarine force could provide 
deterrence by having the capability to elude attack by hiding in the depths 
of the sea, then counter any Soviet attack by destroying all major Soviet 
cities. This retaliation from the sea would provide the kind of deterrence 
Brodie had argued for, and thus, deter a Soviet attack on the United States. 
The Air Force, on the other hand, believed that  
 
effective deterrence is achievable only through possession of a 
striking power that threatens destruction of substantially all of an 
enemy’s long-range nuclear capability [countering nuclear 
forces]…a threat to destroy a large number of Soviet citizens does 
not represent effective deterrence of a Soviet attack against the 
United States.8  
 
In addition, of greater concern to European allies, “It provides no 
deterrence of other forms of Soviet aggression such as an attack against 
another NATO country.”9  
 
Interestingly, William Kaufman, then a member of the Air Force Scientific 
Board and scientist employed at RAND Corporation, decided to apply 
RAND’s mathematical models to the problem of which type of deterrence 
best suited United States deterrence purposes. While much could be said 
about the errors of estimates they were working with at the time, Kaufman 
modeled three scenarios—the Navy-preferred counter-value deterrence 
model, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) preference for mixing the 
models (counterforce and counter-value), and Kaufman’s own preference 
for strictly a counterforce model. The minimum deterrence war gaming 
scenario consisted of a United States retaliatory strike against the Soviets 
after their own plausible first strike an American cities, resulting in 150 
million Americans dead and 60 percent of United States industrial 
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capacity destroyed (on the Soviet side, only 40 million would die and 40 
percent of industrial capacity would be lost). Secondly, using SAC’s 
optimal mix strategy—a mix of counterforce and counter value, half the 
industrial base in each country would be destroyed along with 110 million 
Americans (and 75 million Russians). Finally, and in support of Kaufman’s 
argument, the counterforce (targeting no cities on either side) strategy 
would result in only 3 million American and five million Russian deaths. 10 
As a result, the Air Force became sold on counterforce strategy on the eve 
of President Kennedy’s election and would move in that direction as it 
developed its legs of the nuclear triad during the 1960s. 
 
What the RAND mathematicians ignored was the pressure that would be 
brought to bear on any politician dealing with a few million civilian 
casualties during nuclear war—the revenge factor would likely require 
massive retaliation in all plausible nuclear scenarios. It also ignores Carl 
von Clausewitz’ fundamental dictum concerning chance and friction—once 
a nuclear war starts, these elements would steer the course of events in 
unknown directions, which mathematical models cannot anticipate. 
Deterrence is an effort to prevent war, not determine whether various 
types will minimize the threat of failure or loss of life, as in the RAND 
scenarios. 
 
Driving Kaufman’s calculation was a belief that President Eisenhower’s 
policy of massive retaliation would encourage the Soviets to engage in 
piecemeal aggression. “As long as each side had enough nuclear weapons 
to destroy the other, the threat of massive retaliation to small-scale 
conventional aggression lacks credibility.”11 Massive retaliation was based 
on a counter-value model. Holding enemy cities hostage was supposed to 
prevent nuclear war, but Kaufman asserted correctly, as demonstrated by 
history, that smaller scale wars can be conducted below the nuclear 
threshold. The Soviets had supported North Korea; they would support 
Cuba and North Vietnam during the 1960s and Arab States against Israel 
(aided by the United States) in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. In 
Kaufman’s mind, the proper deterrent must “show a willingness and 
ability to intervene with great conventional power in the peripheral 
areas.”12 
 
Further insight might also be gained from Kaufman’s assertions, as well as 
the earlier-mentioned missile crisis scenario. Consider China’s philosophy 
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of minimum deterrence; China’s simple construction of a counter-value 
nuclear deterrent still deters the United States with far fewer weapons 
than what is in the U.S. inventory.13 For the same reason, the United States 
was deterred from aggression against the Soviets during the Cuban missile 
crisis, despite massive nuclear superiority. Supporting this view is the 
Sechser and Fuhrmann study on Nuclear Weapons and Coercive 
Diplomacy. The authors conclude that nuclear weapons do not provide 
any coercive bargaining advantages, nor does nuclear superiority ensure 
coercive victories during interstate crises. However, when it comes to 
deterrence, nuclear forces minimize the impact of coercive threats from 
challengers; the Indian aggression against Pakistan from 2001 to 2002 
was likely minimized by nuclear deterrence, and U.S. military assistance to 
Ukraine from 2014 to 2015 was reduced by Russian nuclear deterrence.14  
 
Considering the above logic, savings could be gained by reducing plans to 
renew the U.S. nuclear enterprise on the proposed scale—perhaps even 
eliminating a leg of the triad. That savings could be directed toward 
developing a wider variety of both nuclear (in terms of lower yield and 
delivery options) and non-nuclear weapons to improve both U.S. nuclear 
and conventional deterrence, but more importantly, addressing the lack of 
coercive value of nuclear weapons. Where American foreign policy must 
act to prevent nuclear war or prevent impending actions by a rogue actor, 
conventional weapons are more likely to provide coercive bargaining 
power, knowing that the aggressor will more likely use them. 
 
In fact, a conventional counterforce deterrent, accompanied by a nuclear 
deterrent, which provides the means for sufficient counter-value 
retaliation, along with meeting theater nuclear challenges such as Russia’s 
escalate to de-escalate doctrine,15 provides a better means of deterrence 
and escalation dominance. Note that the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) calls for lower yield options for SLBMs and new nuclear-armed air 
and sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs).16 Moreover, 
conventional weapons could be the first line of defense against enemy 
space and cyber-attacks, as well as nuclear weapons use by rogue actors, 
thereby providing a counterforce deterrent. If a theater nuclear war was 
initiated, accidental or otherwise, the use of conventional weapons to 
eliminate remaining enemy nuclear forces would not be accompanied by 
massive civilian losses resulting amongst our enemy’s pressure to retaliate 
with any surviving nuclear weapons. A non-nuclear counterforce enhances 
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bargaining power. Moreover, in the case of nuclear use by lesser powers 
(or even China or Russia for that matter), the United States can still 
threaten enemy cities if they continue nuclear use; we may save our own 
cities and convince an enemy to back down knowing our remaining 
nuclear forces are at least equal to their own.    
 
Strategic Stability and the Trilemma 
 
The classic definition of strategic stability from the Cold War era was 
spelled out by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in their book 
Strategy and Arms Control. Therein the authors posit that a reduced risk 
of war between great powers means not only ensuring that no one has an 
incentive to strike first, but also that the calculation equation prevents risk 
from “shocks, alarms and perturbations.”17 Their definition, when 
compared to Arnold and Brodie’s deterrence concept, not only stipulates 
confidence that a means of answering a first strike with a devastating 
response by surviving forces is guaranteed, but a second strike capability 
must be accentuated by a “prevent risk” equation. Stability against a 
contemplated first strike by itself is not enough to guarantee strategic 
stability, particularly in light of opportunities for unforeseen technological 
advancements to create shocks and perturbations in the perceived balance 
of forces. 
 
Interestingly, Elbridge Colby took on the challenge of defining strategic 
stability for the post-Cold War era with emphasis on the impact of 
President Obama’s 2010 NPR, which advocated a reduced role for nuclear 
weapons, supporting the concept of finite deterrence. Presuming the 
situation stable between Russia and the United States, Colby declared that 
either state would see no “need nor incentive to use nuclear weapons 
except to make clear to an opponent that he had crossed a most vital red 
line with the probability that he would suffer further—and perhaps 
catastrophic—loss if he continued his aggression.”18 Furthermore, “some 
uses of nuclear weapons must be valid for real stability to endure. In a 
stable situation, then, major war would only come about because one party 
truly sought it, not because of miscalculation.”19  
 
It is important to note that Colby’s definition applies to all nuclear-
weapons states and not just Russia and the United States. He continues: 
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strategic stability would definitively not be to attempt to break out 
of a situation of mutual vulnerability, given such an effort’s toxic 
combination of futility and dramatic escalatory impetus, but rather 
to signal to an opponent that he had transgressed a most vital 
interest, to demonstrate one’s resolve about climbing the 
imperfectly controllable ladder of escalation, and to inflict pain on 
the opponent to attempt to dissuade him from pursuing his course 
of action.20 
 
The crux of Colby’s argument is the need to control escalation dynamics 
when an adversary crosses a red line regarding a state’s vital interests. He 
adds, “the side with a greater variety of and more tailored options for 
limited nuclear use would be in a strong position in such a struggle, since 
his threats to strike would be both more credible and his strikes more 
damaging.”21 
 
While Colby’s argument is applicable to the major nuclear powers 
(particularly Russia and China), it applies even more to the rising powers 
and rogues who are more likely risk-takers when considering the 
aforementioned security trilemma and accompanying WMD/asymmetric 
technologies-associated proliferation dynamics. Furthermore, Larsen 
warns that wars appearing as limited to great powers likely look more like 
total war to smaller states, in which case smaller states or non-state actors 
with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will likely 
assume they have little to lose by using them.22 In other words, it would be 
sensible to apply Colby’s logic responding to such threats in the non-
nuclear realm as well. Why not ensure escalation dominance at the 
conventional level against the rising threat of new states and non-state 
actors who acquire WMD and other emerging dangerous technologies? 
Stability is then more likely to be established with the lesser nuclear and 
other WMD/asymmetric technology powers acting against U.S. interests. 
When deterrence fails, conventional escalation dominance can provide a 
denial mechanism to preempt against nuclear or other WMD threats, and 
where necessary defeat rogue actors without crossing the nuclear 
threshold, while still providing a security umbrella to U.S. allies and 
partners in the region.  
 
The security trilemma requires the United States to involve itself globally 
in order to address proliferation concerns that threaten interests of allies 
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and partners in their respective regions. Koblentz describes the security 
trilemma as a “transmission belt, developments that might have mattered 
only at a bilateral level now have the potential to have much wider 
strategic consequences.”23 The trilemma concept also implores the United 
States to act against nuclear proliferation to avoid cascade effects that 
would necessarily follow. It has often been said that Iranian proliferation 
would likely beget Saudi, Egyptian, Emirati, and perhaps Turkish nuclear 
programs to counter the Iranian threat, thus increasing tensions and the 
likelihood of nuclear use in an already tense and war-torn Mideast region. 
Moreover, Paul Bracken reminds us of the second mover proliferation 
advantage. Iran was a second mover, an aspiring nuclear proliferator 
benefitting from those who had gone before. In Iran’s case, Pakistani A.Q. 
Khan passed on uranium enrichment secrets making it easier for Iran to 
begin its own nuclear weapons program. An Iran bomb will likely result in 
the Saudis benefitting from the same source since they will feel threatened 
by Iran. The Saudis may be able to acquire ready-made nuclear weapons 
from Pakistan, which they helped to fund in the first place.24 
 
Strategic Stability via Stratified Deterrence 
 
The essay argues for a new deterrence construct which accounts for the 
changed world of the 21st Century. We now face a multipolar world with 
great powers—the United States, China, Russia, and perhaps India will 
join the club in the future. Other regional powers with nuclear weapons 
(Pakistan, North Korea) as well as regional aspirants (Iran) also play an 
important role in the deterrence construct. Moreover, this new 
environment multiplies the possible outcomes of the security trilemma, 
where deterrence policy of one actor intended to influence another also 
impacts a third (or additional) player(s), and in some cases, many more. 
Furthermore, when one considers that United States extended deterrence 
applies to 30-plus allied or partner states, the United States requires the 
means to provide a so called nuclear umbrella to states all around the 
globe, along with a more complex strategy and ability to tailor deterrence 
to specific adversaries. Tailored deterrence, as discussed in the 2018 NPR, 
means “there is no ‘one size fits all’ for deterrence… the United States will 
apply a tailored approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of 
adversaries, threats, and contexts.”25 Scholars have recently used the 
terms cross-domain or multi-domain deterrence to describe the tailored 
approach, and key to application of the term is mixing nuclear and non-
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nuclear forces in the deterrence construct. The latest NPR includes beefed 
up “missile defenses” as well as a “range of conventional and nuclear 
capabilities” in its construct for a tailored approach.26  
 
To simplify the argument, the United States must first maintain a nuclear 
deterrent to great power conflict, or prevent war with Russia and China. 
Strategic nuclear weapons provide this deterrent, represented by the 
United States triad and efforts to renew all three legs—and while renewal 
is necessary, expanding the escalation ladder may not require all three legs 
of the triad. Money saved eliminating one leg could help pay for the other 
upgrades recommended herein and designed to provide both deterrent 
and coercion effects to other players beyond the great powers. This 
deterrent construct allows a reduced stockpile of nuclear weapons aimed 
at counter-value targets as earlier described by the Chinese deterrent, 
because survival of even one opposing weapon to a first strike is terrifying 
to the attacker. In this manner, the great powers are deterred from using 
nuclear weapons against one another. We can label this the first level or 
stratum of strategic nuclear deterrence. 
 
Secondly, to prevent conventional aggression resulting in follow-on small-
scale nuclear use by one great power against another, or an attempt to 
deescalate a conflict by escalating to theater nuclear use of low yield 
weapons, the United States needs a variety of theater nuclear weapons 
along the escalation continuum in order to match any nuclear use by a 
great power—or regional power for that matter—tit for tat. In the case of 
Europe, this also reassures our NATO allies that limited Russian 
aggression against a NATO member will keep the United States engaged in 
conflict even if Russia attempted limited nuclear use in order to prevail. 
Limited use could be met with limited use, taking away any perceived 
advantage the Russians attribute to their theater nuclear weapons, 
particularly their perceived ability to deescalate a conflict through theater 
nuclear use. American efforts to add lower yield warheads to SLBMs and 
reacquire nuclear armed SLCMs for the Navy, along with Air Force ALCMs 
and upgrades to the B-61 tactical nuclear weapon and addition of a nuclear 
launch capability to the F-35 fighter all fit into this escalation category, 
and are in response to Russian violation of the Intermediate-range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty.27  
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Third, the above-mentioned theater nuclear weapons would also deter 
regional nuclear powers. Any effort on their part to attack a U.S. ally or 
partner could again be met by American theater nuclear weapons. More 
importantly, developing the proper array of advanced conventional 
weapons and ensuring rapid response capability anywhere a potential 
enemy might strike would supplement as well as provide greater control of 
escalation dynamics in regional conflicts. Kartchner and Gerson suggest 
that the “nuclear taboo may not be as strong among emerging nuclear 
powers,” that such powers are likely to use asymmetric means, including 
provocation of third parties to compel their assistance against the United 
States, and therefore, escalation dominance will be required to respond to 
such threats.28 If a regional adversary perceived that nuclear use would 
result in the loss of its nuclear arsenal via escalation dominance, 
particularly via a more credible conventional attack, then it would be less 
likely to use nuclear weapons. Even conventional attack on a U.S. ally or 
partner would more likely be deterred by superior U.S. forces in the 
region, or able to rapidly deploy there. Moreover, in places where 
American forces cannot be made readily available, using the triad savings 
of eliminating one leg to develop Conventional Prompt Global Strike 
(CPGS) weapons would ensure we have the ability to intervene in order to 
deescalate conflicts around the globe. 
 
Lastly, missile defenses are crucial to a stratified deterrence construct. 
Proliferation efforts are just as likely to result in crises riddled with 
misperceptions, the possibility of unintentional missile launches, or 
intentional provocations. In such instances an ability to shoot down an 
attacking missile and prevent its destruction of a target, whether military 
or civilian, saves lives and reduces the pressure for immediate and 
overwhelming retaliation. In addition, in an empirical study, Quackenbush 
determined that "national missile defense enhances deterrence stability,” 
countering traditional deterrence arguments about the destabilizing 
effects of missile defenses.29 
 
Conclusion 
 
Achieving strategic stability in the post-Cold War and post-Superpower 
era has become increasingly complicated in light of the changing 
relationship between the great powers, nuclear proliferation by regional 
powers, and the rise of rogue state and non-state actors capable of taking 
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advantage of asymmetric means of attack. New technological 
breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and unforeseen realms empower 
asymmetries that undermine deterrence at all levels of conflict and require 
a new means of providing deterrence and stability in the international 
system. Cold War deterrence strategy no longer meets the requirements of 
a changed world of the 21st Century. 
 
Early Cold War deterrence theory provides lessons on how to structure a 
more stable international order. Finite deterrence, while unintentional, 
worked for the Soviets in preventing a United States attack on Soviet 
missiles in Cuba, and in fact, U.S. nuclear dominance in the early Cold 
War did not prevent Soviet conventional wars initiated against U.S. 
interests. In essence, finite or minimum deterrence provides the best 
means of stability for great power relations. Still, a revanchist Russia now 
boasts of an escalate-to-deescalate strategy intended to stop a NATO 
conventional response to Russian aggression in Europe. This can only be 
countered at the theater level by responding to theater nuclear use in like 
manner. Moreover, Colby has demonstrated that strategic stability is more 
a function of escalation dominance than nuclear superiority or mutual 
assured destruction vis-à-vis conflict with regional powers. Such 
dominance must exist at the conventional level and be matched or 
exceeded at the theater nuclear level. Conventional weapons are more 
likely to provide coercive bargaining power than nuclear weapons, which 
have been shown to lack coercive value because regional and rogue actors 
do not believe great powers will use them. The great power must dominate 
by conventional means to keep the regional power in check, and this is 
especially applicable when dealing with rogue or non-state actors more 
likely to accept high levels of risk. 
 
Revisiting Colby’s need for more tailored options for each level of conflict, 
this essay proposes the concept of Stratified Deterrence. The United States 
must first continue to deter great power conflict with strategic nuclear 
weapons while understanding that less is more—finite deterrence works—
we can eliminate a leg of the triad to fund the additional needs of 
escalation dominance.30 We need more theater nuclear options to counter 
regional powers. The newest NPR proposes such with lower yield 
warheads for SLBMs, reacquiring nuclear SLCMs for the naval fleet, and 
new ALCMs for the bomber force. Moreover, we should not ignore the 
dual-capable fighter aircraft and role they contribute to both the theater 
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nuclear and conventional construct. Finally, we must also make sure that 
escalation dynamics covers the conventional realm when it comes to 
regional powers and rogue actors. Expanded missile defenses, continued 
power projection via naval and air forces, and an added ability to provide 
CPGS would ensure we can counter any attack promptly. In this manner, 
the U.S. inventory will be better suited to responding to the kinds of 
dynamics all three types of actors might present, particularly concerning 
the Brooks/Rapp-Hooper security trilemma and corresponding unknowns 
of space, cyber and other future asymmetric capabilities that emerge in 
enemy inventories. 
 
In sum, stratified deterrence will allow the United States to prevent or 
quickly extinguish limited nuclear wars that may break out in the 
uncertain environment of the world we find ourselves living in. The 
planned revitalization of the Cold War triad may well deter the great 
powers, but the rising and proliferating regional powers as well as rogue 
state and non-state actors are the greater concern of this era. The 2018 
NPR additions of theater nuclear weapons provide the needs for theater 
nuclear deterrence, but the conventional realm is where the real 
investments are needed—additional naval and air forces along with 
development and fielding of new CPGS weapons are key to responding to 
rogue and non-state actor threats around the globe. But the strategy comes 
at a high price and is likely not affordable alongside replacing the entire 
strategic nuclear inventory; thus, this essay advocates some type of 
reduction in strategic nuclear weapons—providing a finite deterrent 
instead of the planned MAD-based triad. Savings therefrom provide a 
means for additional theater nuclear and conventional weapons funding.31 
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